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The theme of this symposium is exploration of some of the many ways that 
business law incorporates the public interest. This Essay illustrates how antitrust 
law fits within the ambit of public interest law, and invites law students (and 
lawyers) to consider studying and practicing antitrust law. For those law students 
who are interested in business law but are also driven to protect the interests of 
the less privileged and more vulnerable members of society, antitrust law provides 
an avenue for satisfying both aspirations. 
Definitions of “public interest” abound. One could make the case for 
antitrust law as public interest law using political1 or economic2 arguments. For 
some, one’s definition of the public interest reflects one’s political viewpoint.3 To 
avoid the risk of using a loaded description of public interest, the Essay will 
employ a narrow conception of public interest: providing access to affordable 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. The author thanks Tony Reese, 
Akhil Sheth, and Margaux Poueymirou for their helpful comments in earlier drafts. 
1. On the political front, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed the public importance of 
antitrust law by calling it “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and explaining that antitrust laws “are 
as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of 
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.” United States v. Topco Assocs., 
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
2. The economic case for antitrust generally invokes efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust law. 
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2001). 
3. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008). 
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food and medicine. With this principle as my guide, this Essay reviews some of 
the ways that antitrust law helps make food and medicine more accessible to the 
public. 
Antitrust law is the law of competition. Competition in the marketplace 
generally improves the lives of consumers by expanding output and reducing the 
price of products and services, as well as by increasing quality and innovation. 
Monopolies and cartels distort competitive markets by reducing output in order to 
create artificial scarcity, which allows sellers to raise prices. As a result, some 
consumers will not be able to acquire the product or service at all because of the 
contrived shortages. Those consumers who continue to purchase the product or 
service are forced to pay elevated prices. Thus, all consumers are made worse off. 
Antitrust law provides the legal rules for free market economies. At first 
glance, antitrust law may not seem like public interest law. In antitrust litigation, 
economists define markets using economic concepts like cross-elasticity of 
demand and cross-elasticity of supply; they debate issues of marginal cost versus 
average variable cost, and which costs are, in fact, variable. As antitrust law has 
come to rely more on economics, it has become less populist. Looking past the 
economic concepts and jargon, however, one discovers a body of law devoted to 
the public interest. 
This Essay is anecdotal by design; it is intended to give a sense of the many 
ways that anticompetitive behavior can distort access to food and healthcare. Part 
I provides a brief overview of antitrust history, principles, and statutes. Antitrust 
law addresses three major areas of concern: collusion, monopolization, and 
anticompetitive mergers. Each of these areas implicates the public interest. The 
Sherman Act of 18904 is the foundational statute of federal antitrust law. Section 1 
of the Sherman Act addresses concerted action, such as price fixing by cartels.5 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns illegal monopolization and attempted 
monopolization.6 In addition to the Sherman Act, Congress enacted the Clayton 
Act in 1914, Section 7 of which condemns mergers that risk substantially lessening 
competition.7 Although anticompetitive mergers can also violate the provisions of 
the Sherman Act, they are generally analyzed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
Thus, antitrust law addresses three major areas of concern, each which implicates 
the public interest: collusion, monopolization, and anticompetitive mergers. 
Part II discusses the economics of the first area of concern, collusion, and 
explains how cartels profit by reducing access to the necessities of life. A cartel 
exists when a group of competitors conspire to not compete against each other. In 
addition to price fixing by cartels, collusive agreements include bid rigging, group 
 
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
5. Id. § 1. 
6. Id. § 2. Section 2 also condemns conspiracies to monopolize, but this is largely redundant 
with Section 1 and is irrelevant to this Essay. 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
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boycotts, and market division. This Part examines examples of collusive 
agreements in markets related to agriculture and healthcare, and demonstrates how 
enforcment of antitrust law in these areas affects the public interest. 
Part III shows how illegal monopolization injures the public interest. By 
interfering with the competitive process, illegal monopolization often results in 
higher prices and reduced output of goods and services. While some may quibble 
whether the public interest is implicated by the monopolization of luxury goods, 
the public interest is certainly injured when affordable food and medicine become 
less available. This Part provides examples of such injuries, and demonstrates how 
antitrust law can help prevent them. 
Finally, Part IV explains how mergers can affect access to food and medical 
care. This Part provides examples of both successful and failed antitrust actions 
challenging mergers in order to demonstrate the importance of antitrust accuracy. 
Merger enforcement has been uneven over the years, resulting in many markets 
being overconcentrated. Consumers are injured as food and healthcare become 
more expensive, sometimes prohibitively so. As this Part explains, this harms the 
public interest. 
I. FREE MARKETS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The Sherman Act, America’s foundational antitrust law, began life as a 
quintessential public interest statute. The agricultural fields of the American South 
and Midwest sowed the seeds of federal antitrust law. Cartels—groups comprised 
of competitors who agree not to compete against each other—distorted 
agricultural markets not just by cornering the market in a particular foodstuff or 
commodity, but also by controlling the markets in which farmers bought their 
supplies, such as sturdy cloth bags and seeds.8 This significantly reduced farmers’ 
income and kept farmers in an impoverished class.9 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, farmers advocated for anti-
cartel laws through the Granger movement, which mobilized farmers to oppose 
the various interests that distorted agricultural markets. The Grange educated the 
public and focused attention on the problem of agricultural monopolies in the 
post-Civil War era, popularizing political slogans like “[d]own with monopolies.”10 
While the Grangers lost some of their steam as a political movement by 1880, they 
 
8. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 59 (1965) (“The low income of farmers, for which remedies were 
constantly being considered, was often said to be aggravated by various trusts, such as those that sold 
farmers bags and bought their linseed and cottonseed. The general problem of poverty, a great 
concern of the time, was regularly said to be accentuated by the trusts, which were accused of dividing 
the country into two classes, the very rich and the very poor.”). 
9. Id. at 59. 
10. Id. at 67. 
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succeeded in putting a national spotlight on the problem of cartels such that other 
grassroots organizations took up the cause.11 
In the 1880s, cartels began taking the form of trusts, in which competitors 
consolidated themselves into a new business entity. While the Standard Oil trust 
remains the most infamous, the Sugar Trust and Whiskey Trust—both formed in 
1887—were widely and wildly loathed by the American public.12 The ire of 
farmers—especially those in the South angered by the Cotton Oil Trust, among 
others—continued to keep pressure on southern Congressmen to enact federal 
antitrust protections.13 Economists F.M. Scherer and David Ross explained:  
Burdened with rising real debt repayment costs and perceiving 
themselves to be squeezed between the high prices charged for inputs by 
powerful trusts and the falling prices of their own outputs, farmers and 
small business owners clamored for legislation that would constrain the 
trusts’ behavior and redress the balance of economic power.14  
Powerful trusts had already taken over the markets in salt, cordage, oilcloth, 
paving-pitch, slate, gas, and meats.15 The trusts were pinching both farmers and 
consumers. 
As the American public cried out against the trusts, Congress had to take 
action and show that it, too, was alarmed by the growing power of the trusts. In 
response to public concerns about trusts, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890.16 The Sherman Act contains two substantive provisions. Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act condemns agreements in restraint of trade.17 Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act condemns monopolization, attempted monopolization, and 
conspiracies to monopolize.18 Although founded upon a statute, antitrust law is 
essentially common law because the Sherman Act is, by design, skeletal.19 The 
Sherman Act is both a civil statute and a criminal statute. 
 
11. Id. at 68. (“Although the Grange had lost much of its power by 1880, it had served to 
stimulate a revival of antimonopoly sentiments which had been obscured by the more dramatic events 
of the Civil War.”). 
12. Id. at 69–70. 
13. Id. at 69 (“The Cotton Oil Trust was organized in 1884 and the Linseed Oil Trust in the 
following year. The former is said to have angered Southern farmers and to have strengthened the 
demand for a Federal antitrust law . . . .”). 
14. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 12 (3d ed. 1990). 
15. LETWIN, supra note 8, at 69–70. 
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
17. Id. § 1. 
18. Id. § 2. Both sections of the Sherman Act are simultaneously civil and criminal statutes. See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). Section 2, however, has not been enforced though criminal prosecutions in 
years and few Section 1 violations are treated as criminal.  
19. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“From 
the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”). 
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In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTCA).20 The Clayton Act expanded the reach of the Sherman 
Act. For example, whereas the Sherman Act does not mention mergers in its text, 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act explicitly condemns anticompetitive mergers.21 The 
FTCA created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).22 Along with the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FTC is one of the two major 
federal antitrust enforcement agencies.23 
Federal enforcement agencies, state officials, and private plaintiffs enforce 
American antitrust laws. While both the FTC and the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division are entrusted to enforce federal antitrust laws, only the DOJ 
may bring criminal antitrust cases.24 When successful, federal antitrust authorities 
are entitled to injunctive relief and single damages.25 In addition, state attorneys 
general may bring civil antitrust suits as parens patriae actions, which allows state 
officials to sue in the name of their states’ consumers.26 With limited exceptions, 
the successful private plaintiff is entitled to treble damages, which means that 
compensatory damages are automatically tripled.27 These treble damages provide a 
powerful incentive for private plaintiffs to pursue litigation against antitrust 
violators. 
This Essay will show how these statutory provisions, and the common law 
that interprets them, affect the affordability and availability of food and healthcare. 
In both of these realms, anticompetitive conduct can interfere with markets for 
inputs, final products, and delivery systems. For example, antitrust in healthcare 
markets addresses  
numerous industries providing a broad array of products and services, 
including medical care by licensed physicians and other health care 
professionals, inpatient and outpatient services of hospitals and other 
facilities, prescription drugs, durable medical equipment, home health 
services, and a variety of arrangements for delivering and paying for 
 
20. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 and 
29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58). 
21. See infra Part IV. 
22. Section 5 of the FTCA also condemns unfair trade practices. This provision is sometimes 
interpreted in tandem with the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
23. Other federal agencies are sometimes involved. For example, the Federal Communications 
Commission plays a role when communications companies seek to merge. 
24. Only hard-core price fixing and bid rigging is criminally prosecuted. Individuals convicted 
of criminal antitrust violations can be sentenced up to ten years in federal prison. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
25. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 317 (1978) (Congress “affirmatively intended 
to exclude the United States from the treble-damages remedy.”). 
26. Pennsylvania v. Milk Indus. Mgmt. Corp., 812 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
27. A private plaintiff winning an antitrust case may also seek injunctive relief to restore a 
competitive market. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006). 
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health care services, ranging from traditional indemnity insurance to 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs).28  
Parts II through IV will give examples of collusive agreements, anticompetitive 
unilateral conduct, and mergers, respectively, that injure the public interest. 
II. COLLUSION 
Some businesses attempt to increase their profits by entering agreements that 
artificially increase the price of the necessities of life. Antitrust lawyers can protect 
consumers against these anticompetitive agreements. Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act provides, in relevant part: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”29 By condemning “every 
contract . . . in restraint of trade,” the text of Section 1 risks invalidating all 
contracts because every contract restrains trade in some way.30 To prevent this 
result, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1 to proscribe only unreasonable 
restraints of trade.31 Subsequently, federal courts have held several categories of 
contracts to unreasonably restrain trade, including price-fixing agreements, bid 
rigging, group boycotts, and market division. 
In theory, the Sherman Act should have put an end to the trusts’ control 
over agricultural markets. While food markets became more competitive in some 
respects following the enactment of the Sherman Act,32 in many ways cartels 
merely changed their form. Price-fixing cartels took the form of trade associations 
and industry institutes that performed a variety of legitimate functions. These 
organizations, however, also served as cartel organizers and enforcers.33 
Ultimately, many of the cartelized industries that prompted Congress to pass 
the Sherman Act remained in the control of cartels in the following decades. In 
the late 1800s and the early part of the 1900s, for example, overconcentration in 
the meat-packing industry facilitated agreements among the major packers to fix 
prices and divide markets for beef.34 Many members of Congress were particularly 
 
28. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 5 (4th ed. 
2010). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
30. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
31. Id. 
32. Board of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240–41 (1918) (noting the creation 
of more competitive markets for grain); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1896) 
(holding sugar manufacturers to be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act), abrogated by Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122–24 (1942). 
33. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 575, 581, 588–90 
(2004). 
34. 1 SIMON N. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY 
INDUSTRIES 29–31 (1958). 
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concerned about the beef trust.35 For example, Representative Taylor explained 
that 
[t]he beef trust fixes arbitrarily the daily price of cattle, from which there 
is no appeal, for there is no other market. The farmers get from one-third 
to half of the former value of their cattle and yet beef is as costly as ever. 
Even if the conscience of the retailer is touched and he reduces his price 
the trust steps on him and refuses to sell to him or undersells him till he 
is ruined.36 
Like Standard Oil, the companies that colluded through the beef-packing cartel 
(sometimes referred to as the Big Five) received discriminatory rebates from 
railroads, which the dominant packers used to deny a level playing field to smaller 
rivals who were consequently driven from the market.37 A 1918 study of the meat-
packing industry by the FTC concluded: 
The power of the Big Five in the United States has been and is being 
unfairly and illegally used to—manipulate livestock markets; restrict 
interstate and international supplies of foods; control the prices of 
dressed meats and other foods; defraud both the producers of food and 
consumers; crush effective competition; secure special privileges from 
railroads, stockyard companies, and municipalities; and profiteer.38 
Much of this conduct arguably would violate Section 1 today, but the contours of 
the Sherman Act were still ill defined in the early twentieth century. 
The passage of the Sherman Act failed to create competitive conditions in 
agriculture. The blame lies with federal prosecutors (who failed to aggressively 
enforce antitrust law) and with federal judges (who failed to interpret the Sherman 
Act in a manner that kept a check on monopolization, cartelization, and 
overconcentration). In the 1910s, federal courts issued opinions that showed a 
greater willingness to find antitrust liability and to impose more meaningful 
 
35. 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED 
STATUTES 26 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 9th ed. 1978) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
36. 21 CONG. REC. 4088, 4098 (May 1, 1890) (statement of Rep. Taylor), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 298, 315; see also 21 CONG. REC. 4088, 4099 (May 1, 1890) 
(statement of Rep. Bland), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 298, 316 (“We know 
that the contract with the Big Four, so called, covers every state in this Union. They compel butchers 
in every town of any population, East or West, to purchase of them or else they establish by the side 
of those butchers other shops for the sale of beef and, by underselling for a short time, they compel 
the home seller to submit to their dictation.”). 
37. 1 WHITNEY, supra note 34, at 49 (“The big packing companies had been among the many 
corporations that received rebates from the railroads before the Elkins Act of 1903 outlawed them. 
According to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the result was that smaller competitors had ‘in 
the main ceased to exist.’”); see also id. at 50 (“The Federal Trade Commission also charged that the 
large packers received preferential treatment on their cars, including prompter return of empties than 
was given the small packers (who owned less than 10 per cent of private cars).”). 
38. Id. at 36 (quoting FTC, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE MEAT 
PACKING INDUSTRY 32–33 (1919)). 
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remedies, including dissolution.39 The following discussion will show how 
effective antitrust enforcement has improved the lives of consumers by making 
food and healthcare more affordable. 
A. Price Fixing 
Courts have applied Section 1 of the Sherman Act to condemn price-fixing 
agreements among competitors. One of the largest cartels in the modern era is the 
international vitamins cartel, which began operations in the 1980s and continued 
until its detection and prosecution in the late 1990s. Because not every vitamin 
manufacturer makes every vitamin, the international vitamins cartel actually 
represented a series of sixteen cartels with many overlapping members. Major 
manufacturers—notably Roche, BASF, and Rhone-Poulenc—participated in most 
of the individual vitamin cartels. Ultimately, over twenty companies joined 
together and formed a web of collusion that they referred to as “Vitamins, Inc.,” 
which included every vitamin manufacturer with at least a ten percent market 
share.40 Economist John Connor, a leading expert on price-fixing cartels, has 
described Vitamins, Inc. as “the biggest, most elaborate, longest lasting, and most 
harmful of the international cartels” discovered in the 1990s.41 
The vitamin cartels inflicted significant damage. Although estimates vary, 
Connor has calculated that the overcharges in international vitamin markets 
exceeded fifteen billion dollars.42 These overcharges inflated the prices of animal 
products, of fortified foods, of meat, poultry, and fish, of vitamin supplements 
and even of cosmetics.43 Connor noted that it is “particularly reprehensible” to 
engage in “price-fixing schemes that affect products destined for vulnerable 
populations. Children, pregnant or lactating mothers, the sick and the elderly often 
need supplementary vitamins to achieve full health. These groups, as well as 
practically every household, ultimately paid the price of price-fixing in vitamins.”44 
Ultimately, every consumer, including the weakest members of society, was 
harmed by the vitamin cartels. Antitrust lawyers helped end this injustice. 
One of the most notorious recent cartels involves the amino acid lysine, 
which is added to animal feed. The lysine conspiracy is infamous in large part 
because the FBI made videotapes of the actual price-fixing meetings, which were 
played at the criminal trial at which three Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) 
executives were convicted and sentenced to prison for their roles in the 
 
39. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
40. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 252–53 (2d ed. 2008). 
41. Id. at 237. 
42. Id. at 337 (“Measured in 2005 dollars, the damages from the vitamins cartels of the 1990s 
amounts to $15.6 billion . . . .”). 
43. Id. at 238. 
44. Id. at 323. 
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conspiracy.45 The lysine cartel reduced output, which in turn reduced farmers’ 
output and the availability of pork and poultry for consumers.46 During its 
relatively short three-year span, the lysine cartel overcharged consumers around 
the globe between $200 and $250 million.47 Buyers in less well-off nations whose 
consumers ultimately paid higher prices for pork and chicken suffered a 
disproportionate share of this quarter-billion dollar overcharge.48  
Lysine was but one of the international cartels in which ADM participated. 
In 1978, ADM had pleaded no contest to charges that it had participated in illegal 
price fixing for food sold as part of international relief programs.49 More recently, 
ADM played a key role in operating the international citric acid cartel. Citric acid 
is an additive in a wide range of foods from yogurt to sausage.50 For many of its 
uses, such as in soft drinks, there are no substitutes for citric acid.51 Economist 
John Connor estimated that the overcharges borne by American buyers were 
between $116 million and $309 million.52 Price fixing in citric acid markets 
ultimately raises the price of food.53 Furthermore, because the international citric 
acid cartel constrained the American participants’ ability to export citric acid, the 
cartel had significantly worsened—by an estimated $200 million—America’s trade 
deficit.54 
The vitamin, citric acid, and lysine cartels are examples of antitrust law 
working in that the cartels were discovered and punished, and the injured 
consumers brought private litigation that brought some measure of recovery. This 
often requires an understanding of how cartels operate, including the importance 
of market structure and how cartel members use codes, secretive enforcement 
mechanisms, and trade associations to cover their illegal activities. 
Despite these successes, judges’ failure to appreciate how cartels work can 
lead to bad judicial decisions. This is illustrated by the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
involving the potash cartel.55 Potash is a fertilizer used to increase the output of 
agricultural crops. Potash sales total one-half billion dollars annually.56 
 
45. See generally KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (2000); JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN 
THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND (2000). 
46. CONNOR, supra note 40, at 224. 
47. Id. at 235. 
48. Id. at 235–36. 
49. Id. at 127. 
50. Id. at 113. Citric acid sterilizes and stabilizes many foods. Id. It is also used by detergent 
manufacturers as an alternative to phosphorus, which harms waterways. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 165. 
53. See id. at 159. 
54. Id. at 163. 
55. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000). 
56. See DENNIS S. KOSTICK, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES: 
POTASH 124–25 (2007), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/potash/ 
potasmcs07.pdf. 
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International cartels have controlled the trade in potash intermittently since the 
late nineteenth century.57 A group of potash buyers brought a class action lawsuit 
in the 1990s, challenging potash sellers for fixing price.58 The buyers presented 
“evidence of a market structure ripe for collusion, a sudden change from price war 
to supra-competitive pricing, price-fixing overtures from one competitor to 
another, voluntary disclosure of secret price concessions, an explicitly discussed 
cheater punishment program, and advance knowledge of other producers’ price 
moves.”59 Ignoring this evidence and exhibiting a failure to understand how 
cartels operate and what market structures lend themselves to price fixing, a 
narrowly divided en banc Eighth Circuit court affirmed summary judgment for the 
defendants in an opinion riddled with error.60 Coincidentally, after the Eighth 
Circuit exonerated the potash dealers, the price of potash increased almost 300% 
in a four-year period.61 Such price increases generally do not occur in the wake of 
findings of cartel liability. As the price of fertilizer increases, so too does the price 
of food.62 The case illustrates that work remains for antitrust lawyers to educate 
judges about how cartels operate and the harm cartels inflict. 
Price fixing can distort healthcare markets as well.63 Examples abound. In 
one of the earliest Supreme Court antitrust cases addressing the medical 
profession, the Court condemned the American Medical Association’s efforts to 
prevent its members from working with health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), a model for delivering healthcare at lower cost.64 More recently, 
optometrists have illegally fixed the price of eye exams65 and dentists have 
conspired to fix the amount of patient copayments,66 clear violations of antitrust 
 
57. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 332 (2010). 
58. Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1031–32. 
59. Id. at 1051 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
60. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
134 (2005) (describing the Blomkest opinion as a “[f]ailure to account for the distinction between 
rational and irrational conspiracies [that] has led several courts to dismiss conspiracy claims incor-
rectly”); Leslie, supra note 57, at 333–34 (criticizing the Blomkest opinion). 
61. AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN 
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 281 (2008) (“Potash is an important fertilizer. Its price 
increased almost 300% between January 2004 and January 2008.”). 
62. The potash industry is again in the midst of antitrust litigation. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. 
Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (affirming a district court order denying a motion 
to dismiss claims against an alleged international potash cartel). 
63. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 28, at 151–52 (noting that “members of a 
medical society might simply agree on the prices at which they will offer their services; a group of 
providers, through an association or otherwise, might agree to refuse to contract with a health plan 
unless it increases reimbursement or copayment amounts; or the group might develop a schedule of 
minimum fees”). 
64. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 536 (1943). 
65. See United States v. Lake Country Optometric Soc’y, 1996 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 45,095, at 44,781 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 1995). 
66. See United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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law. Price fixing in healthcare markets can also take the form of hospitals 
conspiring to limit the wages of nurses.67 Suppressing wages can contribute to 
long-term shortages of nurses, which can put pressure on the healthcare system.68 
Most price-fixing conspiracies, however, are more direct in their anti-consumer 
effects. For example, price fixing in medical equipment and chemicals used in 
diagnostic equipment has increased the price of healthcare.69 Effective antitrust 
enforcement can deter and remedy such price-fixing schemes and thus reduce the 
cost of healthcare. 
B. Bid Rigging 
In addition to conventional price fixing, in which competitors agree to raise 
price jointly, illegal collusion can also take the form of bid rigging. Bid rigging 
occurs when rivals for a series of contracts agree on who will get each contract at 
an inflated price. Instead of bidding against each other, the rivals rotate the 
winning bids among the conspirators. Although each conspirator agrees to 
intentionally submit losing bids on most contracts, because each conspirator is 
also promised to win a share of the contracts at an inflated price, over the long 
run the conspirators will make more money by rigging than by competing. Bid 
rigging happens in many large building projects, including bridges, schools, and 
other public buildings.70 A case can be made that these examples of bid rigging 
injure the public interest by increasing the price of public projects, which diverts 
funds from other needs, such as education and social services. 
Perhaps the best bid-rigging example to demonstrate the public interest 
component for antitrust law involves sustenance for children. For decades, the 
price of milk for schoolchildren procured through school milk programs has been 
artificially inflated due to a web of bid-rigging conspiracies across the states.71 In 
 
67. See e.g., United States v. Ariz. Hosp. & Healthcare Ass’n, 2007-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 75,869 (D. Ariz. 2007) (Consent Decree and Competitive Impact Statement); see also ABA SECTION 
OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 28, at 152. 
68. See Jeff Miles, The Nursing Shortage, Wage Information Sharing Among Competing Hospitals, and 
the Antitrust Laws, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 305, 338–39 (2007). 
69. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 28, at 153 (discussing United States v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Biochimie, S.A., in which the defendants pled guilty and paid a $5 million fine for fixing 
the price for “a chemical that decreases rate at which X-ray contrast media disperses in the body 
during imaging procedures”). 
70. See Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, Deciding Between Competition and Collusion, 85 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 971, 971 (2003). 
71. See, e.g., Morton’s Market, Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823, 826 (11th Cir. 
1999) (“Beginning in the early 1970s, the Dairies conspired and combined to rig their bids for 
contracts to supply milk to the public school districts in Florida. The Dairies submitted artificial bids 
and effectively divided the school milk market among themselves.”); Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. 
v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119, 121 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Marlinton’s complaint followed a 
1992 investigation by the United States Department of Justice into the milk industry, which had 
resulted in Valley Rich, Meadow Gold, and Borden pleading guilty to charges that they had rigged 
school milk bids.”); Ohio ex rel. Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 
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some instances, a successful school milk conspiracy in one state expanded and 
replicated its success in a neighboring state.72 While some schemes were explicit, 
others were less formal, as providers of school milk who should have been 
competing against each other on price and service instead informed each other “of 
bidding plans, preferred or targeted customers, and specifics as to future bid prices 
to particular customers.”73 Regardless of the form of the conspiracy, the effect of 
this collusion in many markets was to increase the price of school milk.74 Antitrust 
lawyers who successfully challenge these bid-rigging schemes are protecting the 
public interest. 
C. Group Boycott 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act also condemns group boycotts, also called 
concerted refusals to deal, that unreasonably restrain trade.75 Here, too, illegal 
anticompetitive activity impacts the public interest. The healthcare industry again 
provides examples. Medical care providers sometimes illegally agree to boycott 
Medicaid and private insurers unless the payors acquiesce to higher 
reimbursements.76 Recently, competing physicians in Boise, Idaho allegedly 
conspired to refuse to treat patients whose payments were covered by that state’s 
workers’ compensation system.77 The physicians boycotted those particular 
patients in a bid to increase the reimbursement rates.78 The DOJ sued and quickly 
entered a consent decree to stop the offending boycott.79 Group boycotts among 
medical providers are condemned because they increase the price of healthcare.80 
 
(S.D. Ohio 1996) (“The United States indicted three dairies in southwestern Ohio after an 
investigation of illegal behavior in school milk procurement programs. Two dairies, Coors and Meyer, 
plead guilty . . . .”). 
72. Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV. INDUS. ORG. 
413, 444 n.72 (1996); see also Leslie, supra note 33, at 591 (discussing cartel creep, including within the 
southeastern school milk price-fixing cartels). 
73. Lanzillotti, supra note 72, at 455. 
74. See, e.g., Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of 
Bidding, 30 RAND J. ECON. 263, 264 (1999) (estimating that collusion in the school milk procurement 
process in Ohio raised the price of school milk about 6.5%). 
75. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 
(1985). 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Mont. Nursing Home Ass’n, No. CV-80-92-H, 1982 WL 1867 
(D. Mont. July 1, 1982) (consent decree decreeing that the defendant nursing home association 
conspired to not participate in Medicaid unless reimbursements were increased); DeGregorio v. Segal, 
443 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (order denying antitrust defendant nursing homes’ motions to 
dismiss); see also Mich. State Med. Soc’y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983) (final order requiring a medical society 
to cease from entering into agreements with its members as to how to calculate reimbursement rates 
for services). 
77. United States v. Idaho Orthopaedic Soc’y, No. 10-268-SEJL (D. Idaho Aug. 30, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/idortho.htm (final judgment). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986). 
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D. Market Division 
The final category of Section 1 violation that this Essay will explore is 
agreements among competitors to divide markets.81 For example, competitors 
sometimes allocate territory to each other so that each competitor can raise the 
price in its assigned territory without worrying that its competitor will enter that 
market.82 The Supreme Court has labeled such agreements per se illegal, meaning 
that they are illegal on their face, regardless of what their effect is and what 
justifications underly them.83 
In the context of patented pharmaceuticals, market division agreements are 
more complicated due to the regulatory regimes designed to ensure drug safety. 
New drugs must be approved through the New Drug Application (NDA) process. 
To facilitate the entry of lower-priced generic drugs into the market, Congress 
enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, which allows generic drug manufacturers to use a 
simplified procedure for drug approval called the Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) process. When patents expire or are invalidated, generic 
versions of those once-patented drugs enter the market and prices plummet, to 
the benefit of consumers. Similarly, if a generic manufacturer can make a 
noninfringing version of a patented drug, consumers are better off as health care 
costs decrease. The Hatch-Waxman provisions are intended to encourage generic 
drug manufacturers to challenge suspect patents—through the use of a so-called 
Paragraph IV certification—by rewarding the first entrant into the market with 
180 days of exclusivity as the only generic seller of the particular patented drug.84 
Some pharmaceutical companies with patented drugs have exploited the 
provisions of Hatch-Waxman to prolong their monopolies. The companies have 
filed suit against generic drug companies that use the Hatch-Waxman process, 
alleging patent infringement. Like most civil litigation, these cases settle. But, 
unlike other forms of litigation, the terms of the settlement require the plaintiff 
(the patentee) to pay the defendant (the generic drug manufacturer accused of 
infringement).85 As a result, these settlements are often called reverse payment 
 
81. There are many more categories besides the four discussed in this Essay, including resale 
price maintenance and exclusive dealing arrangements, among others. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (discussing resale price maintenance); Tampa Elec. Co. 
v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (discussing exclusive dealing arrangements). 
82. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
83. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“One of the classic 
examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the 
market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition.”). 
84. This solves the collective action problem, whereby no generic firm would pay the money 
to challenge a patent if all of the competing generic firms could immediately enter the market and 
enjoy the benefits of a successful patent challenge without having to bear any of the costs. 
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 148–
49 (2006). 
85. Typically, we would expect the inverse would be true, where an alleged infringer would 
pay the patentholder to settle the case. Plaintiffs do not generally pay defendants in litigation. 
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settlements, or simply reverse settlements. In exchange for the payment, the 
infringement defendant agrees not to sell its generic version of the drug. In 
essence, the patentee is paying its only rival to exit the market so that the patentee 
can continue to charge a monopoly price. 
In one of the earliest cases involving a reverse settlement, the Sixth Circuit 
correctly saw the consequences of such settlements and held that the agreement 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.86 The Sixth Circuit considered the 
patentee’s payment of “$10 million per quarter [to] refrain from marketing its 
generic version of Cardizem CD even after it had obtained FDA approval” as “a 
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”87 In theory, this should have 
put a damper on reverse settlements. Such was not the case. 
In response to the Sixth Circuit’s sweeping condemnation of reverse 
settlement payments, patentees did not cease the arrangements; instead, they 
simply made them more complicated by, for example, disguising the reverse 
payment as a recompense for a license on another, unrelated drug.88 As the FTC 
has paid greater attention to the issue of patentees making payments to generic 
drug manufacturers, these so-called pay-for-delay agreements have gotten more 
complicated, more ambitious, and more lucrative. Professor Scott Hemphill has 
estimated that the transfer of money from consumers to drug companies for the 
delay was $12 billion in one year-long period.89 In a recent report, the FTC 
estimated that pay-for-delay agreements cost American consumers $3.5 billion 
every year in overcharges.90 Only lawyers (and judges) who understand the 
regulatory structure and the economics of pharmaceutical markets can eliminate 
these abuses.91 
When judges failed to appreciate how pharmaceutical firms were 
constructing pay-for-delay agreements, these anticompetitive schemes flourished 
and the public interest suffered. In a series of cases, federal courts upheld 
agreements that delayed competition92 and, thus, increased the price of essential 
 
86. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
87. Id. at 907–08. 
88. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059–60 (11th Cir. 2005). 
89. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to 
Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 651 (2009) (“Overall, the $12 billion benchmark 
estimate is likely to be conservative.”). 
90. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 
2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. 
91. Both the regulatory scheme and the structure of pay-for-delay agreements are more 
complicated than the thumbnail sketch laid out here. For more in-depth presentations, see Michael A. 
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 49 
(2009); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1533, 1560 (2006). 
92. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (2nd Cir. 2008); 
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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medicine. Defendants prevailed and antitrust law seemed incapable of protecting 
consumers. Despite a string of losses, antitrust attorneys—especially those at the 
FTC—concerned about the public interest persevered. Their resolve has started to 
pay dividends, as more recent judicial decisions appear to recognize the dangers of 
pay-for-delay agreements.93 If not for the determination of public-interest minded 
attorneys, pharmaceutical markets would be far less competitive and many 
medications would be considerably more expensive, some prohibitively so. 
III. MONOPOLIZATION 
In addition to entering anticompetitive agreements, some firms may attempt 
to increase their profits by engaging in unilateral anticompetitive conduct. Lawyers 
can use antitrust law to prevent such conduct and to provide a remedy to victims. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns three separate types of conduct: 
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize.94 
Section 2’s condemnation of “monopolization” does not actually prohibit 
monopolies. Rather, it condemns the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
power through anticompetitive conduct.95 Federal courts have not articulated a 
single test for what conduct rises to the level of “exclusionary” conduct that 
violates antitrust laws when done by a monopolist. The Supreme Court has opined 
that “‘exclusionary’ comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) tends to 
impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition 
on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”96 This is not a rule so 
much as a principle that courts have applied to the facts before them. 
As with illegal agreements in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
dominant firms sometimes violate Section 2 in a manner that increases the price 
of food. Monopolies over non-food items often increase the price of food. 
Litigation over seemingly mundane materials can affect the public interest in ways 
that are not immediately obvious. For example, in the early twentieth century, the 
DOJ initiated one of the largest cases in American legal history, an antitrust suit 
against the American Can Company, which, as its name suggest, manufactured 
cans used for packaging food.97 In a trial with over 850 witnesses and over 1,500 
 
93. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2012). 
94. The statute reads, in relevant part: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
95. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the 
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”). 
96. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985) (quoting 
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978)). 
97. United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 859 (D. Md. 1916). 
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exhibits, the government sought to prove that American Can had illegally 
monopolized the market for tin cans in the United States.98 Through a course of 
conduct that included denying its competitors access to can-making machinery 
and tin plate—which compelled its rivals to sell their operations to American Can 
lest they be driven into bankruptcy—American Can dominated the tin can market. 
In 1916, the district court held that American Can had violated the antitrust laws, 
but then denied the government attorneys their requested remedy of dissolution:99 
breaking up American Can into six smaller units that would have competed 
against each other.100 This case, thus, left American Can intact. 
In the wake of the antitrust liability holding, American Can slowed its 
acquisitions.101 Meanwhile, its rival—Continental Can Company—took up the 
mantle of acquiring smaller makers of tin cans.102 Continental Can continued its 
acquisition spree until the market was duopolized—that is, controlled by two 
major market players.103 American Can and Continental Can implemented similar 
pricing and contractual restrictions designed to maximize their profits while 
creating barriers to entry. For example, the two companies pursued similar 
policies, including identical pricing, requirements contracts,104 price discrimination, 
and tying arrangements between the sale of cans and the lease of can-closing 
machines.105 The result was that during the Great Depression, the price of tin cans 
represented between one-quarter and one-third of a food canners’ costs.106 If the 
price of cans had been reduced a mere three percent, American consumers could 
have saved millions of dollars from their limited food budgets every year.107 The 
initial judicial failure to impose a meaningful antitrust remedy ultimately hurt the 
poor and middle classes during America’s greatest economic crisis. 
In 1946, the DOJ brought civil proceedings against American Can and 
Continental Can.108 Again, the court found that American Can violated the 
 
98. Id. at 860. 
99. Id. at 904. 
100. 2 WHITNEY, supra note 34, at 200. 
101. Id. at 201. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. These required canners to purchase all of their cans from the same supplier for three, 
five, and sometimes ten years. Id. at 203. 
105. Id. at 203–04. A tying arrangement exists when a seller refuses to sell a desired product 
(called the tying product) unless consumers agree to purchase a separate product that they do not 
wish to purchase from that seller (called the tied product). Tying arrangements create inefficiency by 
shielding the tied product from competition and by reducing incentives to innovate. See Christopher 
R. Leslie, Patent Tying, Price Discrimination, and Innovation, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 811, 814, 823 (2011). 
106. 2 WHITNEY, supra note 35, at 207. 
107. Id. One effect of this was that the canners were squeezed because they had to lower the 
price of food somewhat as consumer buying power diminished but the canners’ costs remained high 
because of the lack of a competitive market for tin cans. Id. 
108. Id. at 216 (citing United States v. Am. Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949)). 
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antitrust laws.109 This time, instead of no meaningful antitrust remedy, the court 
issued identical judgments against American and Continental.110 The judgments 
required the companies, among other things, to limit their requirements contracts 
to one year; to not impose tie-ins between cans and can-closing machinery; to 
offer can-closing machines for sale; to offer royalty-free licenses to patents on 
can-closing machines; and to not buy out competitors (in metal or fiber containers 
or in the manufacture of can-closing machinery) without court permission.111 
As a result of the antitrust remedy, the market became more competitive as 
smaller can companies won customers.112 Because of the availability of can-closing 
machines, some large canners made more of their own cans, which put price 
pressure on American and Continental.113 As canners showed greater willingness 
to switch their patronage, can manufacturers invested more in research and 
engineering, which resulted in better can-closing machines.114 This juxtaposition 
of a scenario in which antitrust law was not enforced and a scenario in which 
antitrust law was enforced illustrates the moral that effective antitrust enforcement 
against monopolies can improve markets, which inures to the benefit of 
consumers, as the price of food decreases. 
Illegal monopolization is also a serious problem in many healthcare markets. 
Firms have illegally monopolized several aspects of the healthcare system in a 
manner that reduces patient choice and increases healthcare costs. For example, 
the government challenged a Texas hospital for illegally monopolizing the regional 
markets for general acute care inpatient hospital services and outpatient surgical 
services through the use of exclusionary contracts that “financially punished 
payors if they included other hospitals or surgical centers in their networks.”115 
Through these exclusionary contracts, the defendant hospital charged payors fifty 
to seventy percent more than hospitals in comparable Texas cities, as well as 
major metropolitan areas like Dallas-Forth Worth.116 The DOJ negotiated a 
consent decree, which forbade the defendant from conditioning its contracts with 
any payor on the latter’s agreement to not contract with the defendant’s 
competitors.117 In doing so, the DOJ’s antitrust attorneys helped ensure more 
affordable healthcare for consumers. 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 217. 
111. Id. at 217–18. 
112. Id. at 220. 
113. Id. at 219–20. 
114. Id. at 220–21. 
115. THOMAS L. GREANEY & DOUGLAS C. ROSS, SELECTED ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 
IN HEALTH CARE 24 (2012), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/ 
files/AHLA-ABA%20Conference%20(May%202012)%20rev.pdf (discussing United States v. United 
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Similar to the reverse settlement payments, discussed above,118 
pharmaceutical companies sometimes manipulate the regulatory framework for 
drug approval in order to extend their monopolies over particular drugs. One 
example involves conduct sometimes called “product hopping.”119 In Abbott 
Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,120 Abbott had maintained patents 
covering various formulations of fenofibrate, a drug used to treat high 
cholesterol.121 Abbott sold its drug, TriCor, in capsule form. Abbott had received 
FDA approval for TriCor after submitting the necessary safety and efficacy data, 
and the drug information (including relevant patents) was listed in the FDA’s 
Orange Book.122 A pharmacist can—and in some jurisdictions must123—dispense 
the approved generic version of a branded prescription drug, but “only if the 
generic drug has been ‘AB-rated’ by the FDA, which means not only that the 
generic drug is bioequivalent to the branded drug, but also that the generic has the 
same form, dosage, and strength.”124 
Teva sought to manufacture and sell a generic version of Abbott’s 
fenofibrate in a manner that did not infringe Abbott’s patents. To get its generic 
version approved by the FDA, however, Teva would need to take advantage of 
the ANDA process.125 In response to Teva’s Paragraph IV certification, Abbott 
filed an infringement suit, which triggered a thirty-month stay preventing Teva 
from entering the market. A district court judge held that Teva’s formulation did 
not infringe Abbott’s patents.126 However, to further thwart Teva’s ability to use 
the ANDA process to market a cheaper generic version of TriCor, Abbott 
changed the delivery vehicle from a capsule to a tablet, stopped selling TriCor 
capsules, and changed the National Drug Data File code for TriCor capsules to 
“obsolete,” which prevented pharmacists from prescribing Teva’s generic capsules 
 
118. See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text. 
119. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 685, 687 (2009). 
120. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006). 
121. Id. at 415. Abbott had licensed the patents from Fournier, a French company. Id. 
122. The official title is THE APPROVAL DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, a book whose cover is orange, hence its more common name, THE 
ORANGE BOOK. 
123. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“In 
some States, pharmacists must dispense generic drugs absent instruction to the contrary from a 
consumer’s physician. Even when consumers can request brand-name drugs, the price of the brand-
name drug or the consumers’ insurance plans may make it impossible to do so.”); Warner-Lambert 
Co. v. Shalala, 202 F.3d 326, 328 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“When a doctor prescribes a drug by brand name, 
the pharmacist may (and in some states must) dispense a therapeutically equivalent generic alternative 
unless the doctor requires that the prescription be dispensed as written.”). 
124. Abbott Labs., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
125. See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text (describing the ANDA process). 
126. Abbott Labs. v. Novopharm Ltd., Nos. 00 C 2141, 00 C 5094, 01 C 1914, 2002 WL 
433584 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2002). 
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for TriCor prescriptions.127 This effectively prevented low-cost generic 
substitution for higher-cost TriCor. It also delayed Teva’s entry for several 
months.128 
Undiscouraged, Teva developed a generic version of the tablet form of 
TriCor and submitted the appropriate ANDA, along with a Paragraph IV 
certification stating that its product did not infringe Abbott’s patents.129 Abbott 
again filed an infringement suit, which triggered a thirty-month stay preventing 
Teva from entering the market.130 The district court, again, held that Teva had not 
infringed any patents.131 So, Abbott changed the dosage of its FDA-approved 
tablets from 160 mg and 54 mg tablets to tablets with dosages of either 145 mg or 
48 mg.132 Again, the effect of these—seemingly artificial—changes barred 
pharmacists from dispensing Teva’s generic version of TriCor.133 
Teva sued Abbott for illegally monopolizing the market for fenofibrates, 
among other alleged violations. Teva’s case has survived Abbott’s motions to 
dismiss and for summary judgment.134 Regardless of whether Teva ultimately 
prevails, the case shows how monopolists can manipulate regulatory regimes to 
prolong their market power longer than warranted. Even if Teva prevails, 
consumers will have unneccesarily paid higher prices for fenofibrate in the interim. 
These cases involving tin cans, hospitals, and pharmaceuticals are just a few 
of the hundreds in which dominant firms engage in conduct that increases the 
price and decreases the availability of food and medicine. In order to challenge 
these business practices, it is critical that lawyers understand antitrust law, as well 
as regulatory regimes that effect the operation of free markets.  
IV. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
While traditional classes on mergers and acquisitions usually focus on the 
mechanics, financial aspects, and tax implications of business deals, an antitrust 
perspective can introduce the public interest into these discussions. Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, as amended, condemns mergers and acquisitions where “the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to 
create monopoly.”135 This Part discusses how market concentration can increase 
the price of food and medicine, often considerably. When market concentration is 
the result of efficient internal growth and the operation of a free market, antitrust 
law does not condemn it. In contrast, when the merger of two firms—or one 
 
127. Abbott Labs., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 415–16. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 417. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 418. 
133. Id. 
134. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 580 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Del. 2008). 
135. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
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firm’s acquisition of another’s assets—will result in overconcentration in a market, 
the DOJ, the FTC, state attorneys general, or an appropriate private plaintiff may 
challenge the merger.136 
The Sherman Act was initially inspired, in part, by middlemen in agricultural 
and livestock markets colluding—often with the help of railroads—to take 
advantage of both farmers and consumers.137 Antitrust law—both the 
enforcement activity and the substantive common law—ebbs and flows. While in 
the 1960s, federal antitrust authorities were too harsh on grocery store mergers138 
and disagreement exists today over the level of concentration in American 
agricultural markets;139 many commentators argue that antitrust law needs to be 
invoked to reduce the concentration in the markets for pork, beef, and chicken.140 
The pincer play in agricultural markets that partly motivated Congress to 
enact the Sherman Act has returned. On the one hand, overconcentration in the 
markets for agricultural materials, such as seeds, fertilizer, and animal feed, denies 
American farmers access to the most affordable inputs.141 At the same time, 
overconcentration in the markets for processing and delivering agricultural 
outputs prevents American farmers from being able to sell their goods in a 
competitive market. Because middlemen processors absorb the profits, farmers 
receive low prices while consumers pay high prices.142 
Weak enforcement of merger law exacerbates the problem in many 
agricultural markets in part because it has allowed overconcentration in a variety 
of grain and livestock markets. The American Antitrust Institute has explained 
one example: 
In 1999, DOJ allowed Cargill, Inc. to acquire Continental Grain’s grain 
operations subject to some modest divestiture. The immediate result was 
to increase concentration in the business of buying grain such as corn, 
wheat, and soybeans. Farmers found themselves with less competition at 
 
136. Remedies for a successful challenger include enjoining the merger altogether or 
negotiating appropriate divestitures. See Reading Int’l, Inc. v. Oaktree Capital Mgmt. LLC, 317 F. 
Supp. 2d 301, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
137. See, e.g., 1 WHITNEY, supra note 34, at 31. 
138. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
139. See David A. Domina & C. Robert Taylor, The Debilitating Effects of Concentration Markets 
Affecting Agriculture, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 63 (2010) (criticizing a 2009 U.S. General Accounting 
Office report suggesting agricultural markets were not overconcentrated). 
140. AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, supra note 61, at 290–99. 
141. See Domina & Taylor, supra note 139, at 74 (“When America’s farmers and ranchers seek 
to buy needed inputs like seed and fertilizer, they are confronted with concentrated markets and 
exploitative sellers.”); see also AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, supra note 61, at 285–90 (discussing 
overconcentration in markets for seeds). 
142. Domina & Taylor, supra note 139, at 74 (“Consumers are poorly served by existing 
market structures and practices associated with the production and distribution of agricultural 
products. The spread between the price paid to the farmer and the price paid by the consumer 
increases as concentration confirms gains in both food processing and retailing, even after adjusting 
for increased processing of food.”). 
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the farm gate for their crops. As in the case of pork, the levels of 
concentration that resulted are such that there is a significantly increased 
risk of buyer power. Despite the recent increases in the prices for most 
grains, the point here is that the industry structure facilitates the 
extraction by intermediaries such as ADM and Cargill of much of the 
gain that ought to go to the farmer.143 
A similar dynamic has taken place in the milk industry, in which milk 
processors have simultaneously depressed the prices paid to dairy farmers while 
increasing the shelf price for milk at the store. Dairy farmers sell their milk (often 
through cooperatives) to fluid milk processors who, in turn, distribute the milk, 
often through supermarket chains. Overconcentration in the related industries of 
milk processing and supermarkets has created market power that can be employed 
against both dairy farmers and consumers. Although antitrust laws should prevent 
this, economists have argued that “antitrust enforcement has failed to challenge 
successfully horizontal mergers and vertical strategic alliances in many regional 
milk marketing channels including New England.”144 This is not a regionally 
unique phenomenon.145 Farmers are paid less for their milk while consumers are 
charged an excessive price at retail.146 The American Antitrust Institute has 
opined: “The result is an increasing spread between what farmers receive for milk 
and what consumers pay for it. Thus, the failure of antitrust enforcement in dairy 
has resulted in harm to both producers and consumers.”147 Some economists 
worry that divestiture is not enough—that some mergers among supermarkets 
should be challenged and enjoined, full stop.148 
The lack of effective competition in so many junctures of our nation’s food 
growing and distribution network injures farmers and consumers alike. Whether 
one is a carnivore or a herbivore, and whether one’s diet is vegan or heavy in egg 




143. AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, supra note 61, at 306. Note that ADM was the 
ringleader of the lysine cartel and that both ADM and Cargill participated in the citric acid cartel. See 
Leslie, supra note 57, at 281, 330–31. 
144. RONALD W. COTTERILL ET AL., MILK MARKET CHANNEL STRUCTURE: ITS IMPACT ON 
FARMERS AND CONSUMERS, AND THE INADEQUACIES OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AS A 
FOUNDATION FOR DAIRY POLICIES 2 (2003), available at http://www.fmpc.uconn.edu/research/ 
milk/Testimony103003.pdf; see id. at 3 (“The case study also strongly suggests that market power is 
being exercised against farmers in the Northeast via low over-order premiums as well as against 
consumers in Southern New England via higher retail prices.”). 
145. See id. at 3 n.3 (“The current situation is virtually identical in the Pacific Northwest.”). In 
theory, regional supermarket mergers can recreate the bind from the pre-Sherman Act era. 
146. Id. at vi. 
147. AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, supra note 61, at 304 (citing COTTERILL ET AL., supra 
note 144). 
148. See COTTERILL ET AL., supra note 144, at 4 (“[T]he antitrust agencies should have 
challenged this merger rather than attempt to fix it via divestiture.”). 
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overconcentration in agricultural markets, Senator Kohl of Wisconsin summed up 
the situation: 
Unfortunately, it appears that the Justice Department’s antitrust 
enforcement efforts—both in the agricultural sector and generally—have 
been much too weak and passive in recent years. In the opinion of many 
experts, the Justice Department has often failed to take effective action as 
merger after merger in the pork, milk, and seed markets have sharply 
increased concentration and reduced competition. Antitrust 
investigations in the dairy industry have languished with no resolution. 
While the Justice Department sits largely on the sidelines, agriculture 
concentration increases and food prices rise.149 
Some scholars argue that this overconcentration creates a risk to the nation’s food 
supply. For example, because so few meat processors exist, the loss of one 
supplier could dramatically reduce the amount of chicken and beef available to 
consumers and create a market panic.150 Also, to some, it is unclear whether, given 
issues of market concentration and the pincer effect associated with dominant 
processors, farmers can earn enough to remain viable.151 
Overconcentration in healthcare markets has also been a serious problem, 
receiving significant attention since the latest swell in hospital mergers began in 
the 1980s.152 Both federal and state antitrust authorities challenged several hospital 
mergers as anticompetitive, but such challenges generally lost.153 This 
consolidation within healthcare markets has had serious consequences for 
consumers who have paid higher prices while having fewer choices.154 In markets 
where merging hospitals were close by each other, hospital consolidation during 
the 1990s increased overall prices for inpatient care by five percent to over forty 
percent.155 
The wave of hospital mergers was followed by a wave of mergers among 
health insurance companies.156 This has led to price increases of almost ninety 
 
149. Concentration in Agriculture and an Examination of the JBS/Swift Acquisitions: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. 
Herb Kohl, Chairman, S. Comm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45064/html/CHRG-110shrg45064.htm. 
150. See Domina & Taylor, supra note 139, at 78 (“Concentrated agriculture, food processing, 
and food retailing are serious threats to economic well being. Loss or destruction of the nation’s 
largest beef slaughter company and chicken company would leave the nation with a woefully 
inadequate meat supply, likely resulting in mass panic by the public.”). 
151. Id. at 82 (“Farmers receive a shrinking share of the retail food dollar, and the portion 
they receive will not sustain them.”). 
152. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 28, at 216–17. 
153. Id. 
154. Examining Competition in Group Health Care: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary¸109th 
Cong. 86 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), quoted in AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, supra 
note 61, at 322. 
155. AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, supra note 61, at 343. 
156. Id. at 322. 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
2012] ANTITRUST LAW AS PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 907 
 
percent over a six-year period.157 As the federal antitrust agencies did little to stem 
the tide of health insurer consolidation, the result has been “higher premiums, 
higher deductibles, higher co-pays, a greater number of uninsured, and a variety of 
anticompetitive conduct by dominant health insurers. The most severe problems 
occur when employers or employees simply can no longer afford insurance. 
Increasingly, employers have been forced to downscale or even eliminate 
employee insurance benefits.”158 
But the picture is not all bleak. The FTC has also found some success in 
“challenging mergers among pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical 
wholesalers, commercial laboratories, medical-device manufacturers, dialysis 
clinics, vendors of medical therapies and other providers of health care products 
and services.”159 Recently, the FTC has succeeded in enjoining hospital mergers 
that would have decreased competition in already concentrated markets and, thus, 
likely would have increased healthcare costs.160 In some cases, a challenge by the 
FTC can lead healthcare companies to abandon a merger predicted to have 
anticompetitive consequences.161 
Unfortunately, judicial mistakes in application of merger law can be 
particularly perilous in the context of healthcare. A recent Eighth Circuit case 
illustrates how judicial error in antitrust merger litigation harms the public interest. 
Patent ductus arteriosus (PDA) is a life-threatening heart condition that afflicts at 
least 30,000 newborns every year, primarily low birth-weight babies, most of 
whom were born prematurely.162 Although surgical intervention is possible, 
pharmacological (drug) treatment is preferred.163 The FDA had approved two 
drugs for treating PDA: Indocin IV and NeoProfen.”164 The pharmaceutical giant 
 
157. Id. (“There were over 400 health insurer mergers in the past decade and now practically 
every major metropolitan market is highly concentrated. The number of insurers has fallen by just 
under 20% since 2000. These mergers have not led to benefits for consumers; instead, premiums have 
skyrocketed, increasing more than 87% over the past six years.”). 
158. Id. at 323. 
159. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 28, at 218–19. 
160. See, e.g., Evanston Nw. Healthcare, 2007 F.T.C. 210 (2007); see also ProMedica Health 
System, Inc., No. 9346 (FTC Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9346/ 
120328promedicabrillopinion.pdf (enjoining a hospital merger predicted to increase price); ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 28, at 244 (“In another case, the Division enjoined an 
agreement between two hospitals by which they agreed that one would not open a cardiac-surgery 
program to compete with the other’s program.”) (discussing Consent Decree and Competitive Impact 
Statement, United States v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 2006-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 75,313 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2006)); FTC, FTC CHALLENGES OSF HEALTHCARE SYSTEM PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF 
ROCKFORD HEALTH SYSTEM AS ANTICOMPETITIVE (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2011/11/rockford.shtm (merged entity would have controlled 64% of the relevant market). 
161. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc., No. 9352, File No. 111 0239 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2012) (Order 
Dismissing Complaint), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9352/120223omnicareorder.pdf 
(merger between rival pharmacies abandoned due to FTC challenge). 
162. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 2011). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. The drugs are not bioequivalents and have different side effects. Id. 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
908 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:885 
 
Merck owned the rights to NeoProfen, for which it charged $77.77 per treatment. 
Lundbeck owned the rights for Indocin IV, a significantly higher-priced drug. 
Lundbeck acquired the rights to NeoProfen and within two days of the acquisition 
raised the price of NeoProfen thirteen-fold, eventually charging $1,522.50 per 
treatment.165 The FTC challenged the acquisition as a violation of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.166 Following a bench trial, the district court held for Lundbeck, 
concluding that the FTC failed to prove that Indocin IV and NeoProfen 
competed against each other in the same relevant product market.167 The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed.168 The acquisition was permitted and the price of life-saving 
medicine skyrocketed. The Lundbeck case demonstrates how the failure to 
understand antitrust and markets has serious consequences. For some babies, 
effective antitrust enforcement can literally mean the difference between life and 
death. 
CONCLUSION 
A body of law—like antitrust—that makes food, medicine, and the other 
necessities of life affordable is public interest law. In the context of healthcare, the 
former chairman of the FTC noted the importance of antitrust law by explaining 
how “[a]ggressive competition promotes lower prices, higher quality, greater 
innovation, and enhanced access. More concretely, in health care, competition 
results in new and improved drugs, cheaper generic drugs, treatments with less 
pain and fewer side effects, and treatments offered in a manner and location 
consumers desire.”169 An effective antitrust law regime makes appropriate 
healthcare both more affordable and more accessible. 
As price fixing and other collusive agreements continue to be a problem in 
many agricultural markets, antitrust law remains necessary to deter and prevent 
collusion that results in higher food prices. Surely the provision of milk to 
schoolchildren is a quintessential public interest. Some public interest lawyers, 
such as those who do children’s advocacy, try to feed poor children. Some 
antitrust lawyers try to achieve the same goal by helping to ensure that the price of 
milk for school lunch programs is not artificially inflated by illegal price fixing. 
This helps keep school lunch programs affordable and intact. 
All modern economies need an effective antitrust regime to ensure that 
illegal monopolies and collusion do not displace competition. Antitrust law helps 
achieve a litany of noble goals. Antitrust law helps get milk to schoolchildren, 
 
165. Id. This was still cheaper than the $1,614.44 that Lundbeck charged for Indocin IV. Id. 
166. See id. 
167. Id. at 1239. 
168. Id. at 1243. 
169. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Opening Remarks Before the FTC/DOJ Hearings on 
Health Care and Competition Law and Policy (Feb. 26, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.ftc 
.gov/ogc/healthcarehearings/docs/030226muris.shtm). 
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vitamins to the elderly and to pregnant women, fuel to households, and more 
affordable food to everyone. Antitrust law improves access to lifesaving 
pharmaceuticals and medical services. Yet antitrust laws could not achieve these 
results without public interest attorneys committed to enforcing the laws of 
competition. 
  
